Leaving Najaf

I want to make sure I have all my facts straight concerning Najaf:

• Just before Sistani is flown to London for medical treatment, Sadr throws another hissy fit and takes over the Imam Ali Shrine
  
• Fierce fighting persists between Sadr's Mahdi Army, US forces, and 2-3 token Iraqi soldiers, for 3 weeks in a city that holds no strategic military importance
  
• Sistani comes back to Iraq and brings 10,000 of his closest friends to Najaf for a slumber party
  
• Sadr goes, "Dude!" Sistani goes, "Dude!" They meet, and suddenly Sadr surrenders, but he and everyone in the Mahdi Army get off scot free. Meaning Sadr still has an army to cause trouble with.

That's correct, right? I want to make sure, because the whole situation just seems odd. We've seen reports of this battle for the past 3 weeks, but we've never really been given a reason why this battle is happening. Why did Sadr stage this battle knowing that Sistani would eventually be back in town? Was this a powerplay against Sistani, the new Iraqi government, the US military, or all three?

Juan Cole posted some thoughts on it this morning.

Winners and losers:

I think the big losers from the Najaf episode (part deux) are the Americans. They have become, if it is possible, even more unpopular in Iraq than they were last spring after Abu Ghuraib, Fallujah and Najaf Part 1. The US is perceived as culturally insensitive for its actions in the holy city of Najaf.

The Allawi government is also a big loser. Instead of looking decisive, as they had hoped, they ended up looking like the lackeys of neo-imperialists.

The big winner is Sistani, whose religious charisma has now been enhanced by solid nationalist credentials. He is a national hero for saving Najaf.

For Muqtada, it is a wash. He did not have Najaf until April, anyway, and cn [cannot]easily survive not having it. His movement in the slums of the southern cities is intact, even if its paramilitary has been weakened.

I agree with Juan's first 2 reasons. If Sadr has had one clear objection thus far, it's been to stick a telephone pole up America's ass. Sideways. I don't imagine he sees much of a difference between the US and Allawi, since Allawi is in power under our bidding and not any democratic election. The last two reasons I tend to agree with, but I'm a little fuzzy on. Was this a misfired powerplay against Sistani? Given the amount of damage Najaf has suffered, and how many Iraqi citizens Sadr's people have killed, it's unlikely that he gained any popularity points. But was he trying to? And does his meeting with Sistani show just how much Sadr's power has grown? Before our occupation, Sadr was just this little shit cleric, but does meeting with the Grand Ayatollah place him more on Sistani's level of leadership? Sistani's in his early 70s, whereas Sadr's only in his early 30s. Could this have been a powerplay to raise his stature among Iraqis so if and when Sistani kicks the bucket, Sadr's ready to fill the power vacuum?

There had to have been a reason for this battle, I'm just searching for it. Your thoughts on the matter will be appreciated.